Securing critical infrastructure gives everyone in industry a role in protecting us from harm

A NEW acronym is looming in the public consciousness: CI. 

We're going to be hearing a lot more about it this year and probably for many years to come.

It stands for 'critical infrastructure' and we ­who work in air and other cargo modes or logistics ­ are very much part of it.

The concept itself is not new.  Weíve known for generations that it is vitally important to ensure that transport, energy, IT systems and telecommunications, the structural integrity and resources of the finance sector, the governance framework and food/water sources all are protected from interference.

The past decade however has brought a growing complexity in national security risks, both external and within individual countries.

We are increasingly vulnerable and need to be not only more keenly aware of this but also ready to protect ourselves.

Earlier this year the Commonwealth government established a Critical Infrastructure Centre (CIC) within the Attorney-Generalís department.

It hasn't drawn the attention it deserves, with some commentators seeming to suggest it is just another bureaucratic entity of little genuine value.

A statement under the joint signatures of federal ministers George Brandis and Scott Morrison noted that 'with increased privatisation, supply chain arrangements being outsourced and offshored, and the shift in our international investment profile, Australia's national critical infrastructure is more exposed than ever to sabotage, espionage and coercion'.

The ministers stressed that 'we need to manage these risks by adopting a co-ordinated and strategic framework'. 

And that's not something the federal government can address alone.

Hence the CIC, which will act as a policy planning hub, aiming to move past the 'think tank' stage quickly to build a real security framework that can be activated rapidly in time of threat or actual attack.

Brandis and Morrison said the centre would 'develop whole-of-government national security risk assessments and advice to support government decision-making on investment transactions.  It will also provide greater certainty and clarity to investors and industry on the types of assets that will attract national security scrutiny'.

The initial focus will be on the most-critical assets in the electricity, water and transport sectors, but the centre will consult widely to consider what other assets require attention.

The CIC will also develop and maintain a critical assets register that will enable a consolidated view of critical infrastructure ownership in high risk sectors across the country.

This will help to proactively manage the national security risks that can arise from operational and procurement strategies.

Several other countries have similar CI centres or are working towards them.

In the UK, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure provides information, personnel and physical security, while the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection is a work in progress.

USA has had a wide-reaching Critical Infrastructure Protection Program in place since 1996. Its Patriot Act of 2001 defined critical infrastructure as those 'systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States  that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters'.

For all the growing global focus on CI, a balanced understanding of its importance is still evolving at key levels.

In 2008 Tyson Macaulay's Critical Infrastructure: Understanding its Component Parts, Vulnerabilities, Operating Risks and Interdependencies suggested that despite all the security technology available for threats and risks to CI, this crucial area often generates more fear than rational discussion.

"Apprehension unfortunately prompts many involved in CI policy to default to old-fashioned intuition rather than depend on modern concrete risk assessment as the basis for vital security decisions."

The book postulates the concept of CI as an industrial and enterprise risk conductor, 'highlighting the reality that a CI failure can propagate a crisis with far-reaching repercussions'.

It was published by CRC Press, part of the giant Taylor & Francis Group.

Securing critical infrastructure gives everyone in industry a role in protecting us from harm

A NEW acronym is looming in the public consciousness: CI. 

We're going to be hearing a lot more about it this year and probably for many years to come.

It stands for 'critical infrastructure' and we ­who work in air and other cargo modes or logistics ­ are very much part of it.

The concept itself is not new.  Weíve known for generations that it is vitally important to ensure that transport, energy, IT systems and telecommunications, the structural integrity and resources of the finance sector, the governance framework and food/water sources all are protected from interference.

The past decade however has brought a growing complexity in national security risks, both external and within individual countries.

We are increasingly vulnerable and need to be not only more keenly aware of this but also ready to protect ourselves.

Earlier this year the Commonwealth government established a Critical Infrastructure Centre (CIC) within the Attorney-Generalís department.

It hasn't drawn the attention it deserves, with some commentators seeming to suggest it is just another bureaucratic entity of little genuine value.

A statement under the joint signatures of federal ministers George Brandis and Scott Morrison noted that 'with increased privatisation, supply chain arrangements being outsourced and offshored, and the shift in our international investment profile, Australia's national critical infrastructure is more exposed than ever to sabotage, espionage and coercion'.

The ministers stressed that 'we need to manage these risks by adopting a co-ordinated and strategic framework'. 

And that's not something the federal government can address alone.

Hence the CIC, which will act as a policy planning hub, aiming to move past the 'think tank' stage quickly to build a real security framework that can be activated rapidly in time of threat or actual attack.

Brandis and Morrison said the centre would 'develop whole-of-government national security risk assessments and advice to support government decision-making on investment transactions.  It will also provide greater certainty and clarity to investors and industry on the types of assets that will attract national security scrutiny'.

The initial focus will be on the most-critical assets in the electricity, water and transport sectors, but the centre will consult widely to consider what other assets require attention.

The CIC will also develop and maintain a critical assets register that will enable a consolidated view of critical infrastructure ownership in high risk sectors across the country.

This will help to proactively manage the national security risks that can arise from operational and procurement strategies.

Several other countries have similar CI centres or are working towards them.

In the UK, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure provides information, personnel and physical security, while the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection is a work in progress.

USA has had a wide-reaching Critical Infrastructure Protection Program in place since 1996. Its Patriot Act of 2001 defined critical infrastructure as those 'systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States  that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters'.

For all the growing global focus on CI, a balanced understanding of its importance is still evolving at key levels.

In 2008 Tyson Macaulay's Critical Infrastructure: Understanding its Component Parts, Vulnerabilities, Operating Risks and Interdependencies suggested that despite all the security technology available for threats and risks to CI, this crucial area often generates more fear than rational discussion.

"Apprehension unfortunately prompts many involved in CI policy to default to old-fashioned intuition rather than depend on modern concrete risk assessment as the basis for vital security decisions."

The book postulates the concept of CI as an industrial and enterprise risk conductor, 'highlighting the reality that a CI failure can propagate a crisis with far-reaching repercussions'.

It was published by CRC Press, part of the giant Taylor & Francis Group.